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FOREWORD 
One-fourth of t h e  world's population l i v e s  i n  China. The f u t u r e  of 
g loba l  population growth, the re fo re ,  i s  inex t r i cab ly  l inked with t h a t  of  
t h e  People's Republic. Yet our  knowledge and understanding o f  t h a t  n a t i o n ' s  
demography i s  remarkably inadequate. 
Nathan Keyfitz spent ~ a n u a r ~  1 - 22, 1982 i n  t h e  People 's  Republic of  
China as  p a r t  of  a  d is t inguished scholar  exchange program. He had a near ly  
u n r e s t r i c t e d  opportunity t o  v i s i t  f a c t o r i e s ,  h o s p i t a l s ,  and o ther  i n s t i t u -  
t i o n s  and t o  meet peasants i n  Hebei and 6ichuan Provinces. On t h e  b a s i s  of 
t ape  recordings of interviews with v i l l a g e  o f f i c i a l s  and with v i l l a g e r s  on 
quest ions of p roduc t ionaswel l  a s  on populat ion con t ro1 ,hehas  w r i t t e n  t h i s  
r e p o r t .  It ou t l ines  i n  c r i s p  d e t a i l  how China's populat ion f a c t o r  i s  embed- 
ded i n  a  number of s o c i a l ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and economic i s sues .  
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ABSTRACT 
China's e f f e c t i v e n e s s  i n  popula t ion  c o n t r o l  can  be  c r e d i t e d  t o  t h e  
d i r e c t  l i n e  of command through p a r t y  and admin i s t r a t i ve  c a d r e s t h a t  extends 
from t h e  l e a d e r s h i p  i n  B e i j i n g  down t o  t h e  product ion  team i n  a d i s t a n t  
r u r a l  commune. The reason  t h a t  t h e  admin i s t r a t i ve  machine has  devoted s o  
much a t t e n t i o n  t o  popula t ion  c o n t r o l  i s  twofold: t h e  perce ived  l i m i t s  of  
t h e  n a t u r a l  environment, a s  i nd ica t edbys lownesso fg rowth  of  food supp l i e s ,  
and t h e  d i f f i c u l t y  of a r r ang ing  product ive  employment f o r t h e l a r g e  cohor ts  
of t h e  1960s. The employment problemis  i n t e n s i f i e d  by m e ~ h a n ~ z a t i o n i n t h e  
count rys ide ,  and a p p l i e s  e s p e c i a l l y  t o  t h e  inc reas ing  numbers o f  middle- 
school  graduates .  Rais ing  t h e  c a p i t a l  t h a t  would employ t h e  new e n t r a n t s  
i n t o  t h e  l a b o r  f o r c e  p roduc t ive ly  involves undes i red  commitments f o r  repay- 
ment i f  money i sbor rowed a b r o a d a n d r i s k s  p o l i t i c a l  t e n s i o n i f t h e  exac t ions  
from t h e  r u r a l  popula t ion  go beyond a c e r t a i n  p o i n t .  Among o t h e r  p o t e n t i a l  
sources of  d i v i s i o n  i s  t h e  ambit ion o f  t h e  young genera t ion  t o  g e t  ahead 
wi th  work and c a r e e r s ,  and t h e i r  f e a r  t h a t  t o o  many of t h e  l i m i t e d  number o f  
p l aces  a r e  be ing  he ld  by t h e  o l d .  The one-child family now be ing  promoted 
would avoid  r e p e a t i n g  about t h e  t u r n  of  t h e  century  t h e  p re s su res  t o  f i n d  
jobs now be ing  experienced. On t h e  o the r  hand it would make f o r  a very  
awkward age  d i s t r i b u t i o n  a s  t h e  b i r t h s o f t h e  1960s appear a s  c la imants  f o r  
o l d  age s e c r u i t y  about 2040. 
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Drastic changes have taken place in China during the 6 years since the  
death of Mao and the removal from power of the "gang-of-four." While equa1j.t~ is 
still important, such inequality as results from higher education ~ n d  the needs 
of advanced technology is increasingly accepted. Sending young people to  the 
fields for several years is no longer seen as an answer to  any problem, and 
those who were compelled to  work as farm hands during the cultural revolution, 
necessarily a t  the cost of their education, blame their lack of subsequent pro- 
gress on that  gap in their studies. The notion that Communism can cope with 
any population however large has been dropped, and now one hears rather tha t  
resources of food, water,and capital are limited and that  people added to  the  
population by the high births of the 1960s will not easily be able to  produce their 
subsistence. We will see how the population question is embedded in a number of 
social, political, and economic issues. 
The rapid growth of population during the 1960s and early 1970s seems t o  
underly not only the  sharp measures of population control but also the policy of 
"self-reliance" that  is the current watchword. Detailed central planning for the  
productive employment of a labor force of 600 million, growing by a net  
increase of a s  much as  20 million in a single year, has effectively been aban- 
doned. Some central planning will continue, but it will make no pretense of cov- 
ering every enterprise. This delegation of planning downward, to provinces, 
communes, and smaller regions, is justified above all by the need to make jobs, 
jobs that  will raise the  standard of living. It is conceded that  the central plan- 
ning of the USSR indeed maintains full employment, but  the production of 
needed goods in Chna requires more thought and planning than the central 
government considers itself capable of. 
Now that the delirium of the cultural revolution is past, Chinese leaders an6 
their public understand the close relation between population and economic 
advance in a country whose population has probably passed the billion mark and 
whose area is equal to that of the United States. Unlike the United States, 90 per 
cent of China is mountain or desert, not good for agriculture or much of any- 
thing else. The relation of population to progress shows up as an ecological 
upset with intermittent famine in the Sahel, as premature urbanization in Latin 
America. In Chna t b s  relation shows itself especially clearly as  an employment 
problem, now that the high births of the early 1960s are appearing as young peo- 
ple needing jobs. Committed to full employment of the young people leaving 
school each year, the central government can only fulfill this responsibility by 
giving relative freedom to local groups, to provinces, municipalities, communes, 
and so on down to the production team--a part of a village containing perhaps 50 
families. 
The self-reliance policy is applied at all levels: between China and foreign 
countries (restraint in incurring incejtedness to American and Ecropean 
banks); between the different levels of government, with each level distancing 
itself from claims against it by lower levels; between individuals, who are given a 
certain freedom of action and urged to be responsible for themselves as far as 
they can. This displacement of i-esponsibiiiiy downward may well be the only pol- 
icy that fits the size of the population, and the fact that every smallest resource 
must be cultivated if people are not to starve. It is hard to visualize the collec- 
tion of night soil bureaucratized and made part of a central plan. 
If devolution of responsibility is the right policy for agriculture, for cottage 
industry making flour and other food products, brick-making, house construc- 
tion, and clothing; it is less certain that it is right for heavy industry. In the 
present phase where the authorities emphasize light industry and where per 
capita income is on the order of 3450 per year, self-reliance fits well. The ques- 
tion is what happens a t  a later stage, when automobiles take the place of bicy- 
cles, and trucks displace handcarts. Small-scale manufacture of heavy equip- 
ment can be wasteful of capital, materials, and labor. 
Population growth and the resultant employment problem is only part of 
what has moved the state to pass power downward. The other part is the need 
for income of governments at all levels. Insofar as individual salaries are set by 
law it is not necessary to tax individuals. Redistribution is accomplished by suit- 
ably fixing wages and prices. The levies that provide the funds for any level of 
government are assessed on the productive unit. Hence what every government 
wants under its auspices is productive units. Any new enterprise that makes a 
profit will to that degree help the financial balance of the government that 
sponsored it and contribute funds to aid further new enterprise. 
My interviews in communes and production brigades show that those con- 
cerned have in mind two kinds of bookkeeping for each political unit--a financial 
balance in which there are enough taxable profits to maintain the administra- 
tive, police, health, educational, and other services with which the unit is 
charged, and a population balance in whch the labor employed is equal to the 
labor available. 
The labor available is increasing rapidly as those born in the 1960s mature, 
and at  the same time the need for labor in the fields is gradually being reduced 
by mechanization. Ploughs that one walks behind, like our roto-tillers, are com- 
ing into use. Trucks are increasingly available for transport, in place of the 
shoulder-yoke. I t  is true that some of the vehicles look home-made, and they 
would not win prizes for reliability, but they still cut the manpower used in tran- 
sport by a large factor. Cultivation has always been intensive, but  now seed- 
varieties that can benefit from fertilizer, along with supplies of synthetic fertil- 
izer, are further increasing the crop. Thus food output, while not as great as 
desired,* is by and large able to keep up with natural increase; but the prospect 
is that it will not require a proportional increase of labor. 
INITIATIVE FOR CREATING PRODUCTm El.lPLOYF.1EhTT 
As thngs stand there is little tendency to put people to work just for the 
sake of keeping them busy. China resembles our private enterprise system, at  
least in that if workers cannot produce saleable objects there is no source from 
which the money to pay them can be taken. I heard no expression of the illusion 
that putting people on the payroll and printing the money to pay them will 
accomplish anything worthwhile. 
If a comrade wants to start a brick plant in the village, he will have to per- 
suade some authority--perhaps the Brigade Committee--to advance the cost of 
the kiln. He may secure working capital from the local bank. He can then go 
ahead and )ire labor, build the kiln, and sell the product to his neighbors or to 
distant customers that  his salesmen turn up. Because the regime is not yet 
aware of the advantages of intermediaries there is a lack of wholesalers and 
shippers; whether present trends towards devolution will go so far as to accept 
private trade is yet to be seen. 
The brick plant is owned by the Committee or other authority under which 
it was established and the material compensation of the entrepreneur is limited 
to his salary, but he has much other compensation. As a manager he becomes 
an important man in the community; he gives jobs to his friends and relatives; 
he can sell the product at  a discount to his neighbors. These are powerful incen- 
tives. 
*One official statement had it that 10 percent of the population is underfed (A. Do& Barnett, 
China's Economy in Global Perspective, Washington, D.C. 1981. The Brookings Institution, 
p.305) 
Of course there are constraints of a kind that do not limit the American 
entrepreneur. The business is a public one, and has to meet standards of 
propriety. An employee cannot simply be dismissed. If a mistake has been made 
in hiring, and the person is incapable of doing the job, then the manager will 
have to find a job for him that he can do. If the employee is unwilling to work, 
then he must be spoken to. The Chnese express an almost infinite faith that  
any kind of delinquency may be handled by showing the person the error of his 
ways, and they have enormous patience in dealing with delinquents. Correction 
rather than punishment is always the object; Americans often talk t h s  way, but 
the Chinese believe it. Workers are essentially good, capable, and industrious, 
and it is the task of the manager to bring out this goodness. 
Though job security is precious the present labor surplus has forced many 
young people into what is called provisional employment, often far below their 
qualifications. A middle-school graduate may operate a sewing machine in a 
clothing factory, until something in the administrative service opens up. The 
expansion of the educational system above all has made the employment prob- 
lem especially-acute for middle-school graduates--not yet a crisis but capable of 
becoming one. Expansion of the central bureaucracy has gone further than any- 
one thinks desirable, and so the facile creation of white collar adminstrative jobs 
is hardly the answer. 
AXES OF POTENTIAL, CONF'LlCT 
Built into a system that is deslgned for harmony are a number of axes of 
potential cleavage. The cultural revolution attacked particularly the advantages 
of the better educated and urban dwellers. Mao Zedong preferred barely con- 
trolled chaos to a stable system in which a class of office holders would establish 
themselves forever. Given that 80 percent of China still gains its living in the 
countryside the potential for some later movement with aims similar to the 
cultural revolution cannot be dismissed. For the moment this danger is dimin- 
ished by the increased prices offered in the state food collection centers, and by 
the free markets to which peasants can bring produce for sale on their personal 
account. A limit is set  by taxes on such individual incomes, but nonetheless 
many a peasant lives better  than some senior bureaucrats. A television set  in a 
rural home is still exceptional, though I did see some, based on the sale of pro- 
duce on nearby free city markets. 
For the moment the distant peasants are disadvantaged, since the lack of 
middlemen means that they cannot have access to  city markets. on the average 
rural incomes are  a small fraction of city incomes. Yet as long as the variation in 
income among neighbors is held down there is less ground for discontent. The 
authorities hope to  be able to tackle the differentials among regions in due 
course. 
The division between young and old is a more immediate trouble, and the 
regime has recently required the resignation of certain senior officials, a meas- 
ure that  symbolizes its sympathy for the young who see their promotion as 
blocked. 
Beyond all this, of course, is the people versus their leaders if present poli- 
cies do not produce an  increasing supply of goods. 
In the context of the limitations of nature and the various potential sources 
of conflict, birth control emerges naturally. If births are reduced to  half of what 
they were a t  the peak, I heard i t  said, then 15 or 20 years from now there will be 
half as many job-seekers, less resort to submarginal land, less tendency to over- 
crowd the cities or pressure to  make jobs in the bureaucracy. These are not 
exactly the arguments that  one reads in the  professional western demographic 
literature, but they correspond to the immediate visual impression that  masses 
of people make on the Chinese. 
THE FOUR MODERNZZATIONS 
The acquisition of modern technology from the west (in contrast to the 
Maoist tenet that the masses can improvise everything needed) has become a 
major instrument of economic progress. In agriculture, industry, science, and 
the military, the aim is to import whatever knowledge is necessary--both by 
sending Chinese students abroad and by having foreigners come to China. The 
policy is associated with Deng Xiaopeng, and no one can be sure how it will be 
modified when he passes off the scene. Even a t  the present time financial con- 
straints have caused cancellation of some ambitious plans to import whole fac- 
tories, and the policy now is to construct factories with domestic resources, 
buying abroad only indispensable machinery that cannot be made in China. 
The modernization program has tempered self-reliance by some borrowing 
from foreign governments, banks, and suppliers. One agreement with France in 
1978 provides for $6.8 billion in long-term credits over 10 years. Another with a 
consortiurn of seven British banks in the same year provides for a loan df $1.2 
billion. In 1979 Japan agreed to lend $2 billion, and the same amount was pro- 
vided by the Export-Import Bank of the United States. As far as possible China's 
transactions take the form of barter; thus Japan is to develop oil resources in 
Bohai Bay and will take part of the oil that results. Fear of indebtedness has 
roots in Chinese hs tory  of the past century as well as in observation of contem- 
porary borrowing countries. 
Mao's view that China's masses could accomplish every task by their sheer 
numbers did not lead to emphasis on birth control. It is especially in the context 
of the four modernizations that family planning fits as a necessary part. On the 
one hand the introduction of machinery seems wrong and will be resented by the 
people displaced if they are so numerous that  employment cannot be found for 
all of them. On the other hand the existence of a large, and especially of a grow- 
ing population, will require schools and many other facilities, whose provision 
will reduce the resources available for capital investment in new fields. 
POPULATION AND T S  PROSPECTZYE GROWTH 
Pending the Census to be taken in June of 1982 all statements of China's 
population and its rate of growth have to be provisional. If we start with the 
official figure provided by the State Statistical Bureau and subtract Taiwan, we 
obtain 980 million for mid-1979*, so it is nearly sure that the mainland has 
passed the billion mark by now. 
Various estimates are available for the future, those by John S. Aird of the 
United States Bureau of the Census being especially well-regarded. Aird's low 
estimate, which seems the preferred one, shows 1,255 million for the year 2000. 
That implies an average of something like a 12 million annual increase between 
now and the end of the century, the difference between about 10 million births 
and 6 million deaths. These are close to the present numbers of births and 
deaths, and assuming they will be the average for the rest of the century implies 
moderate continued success of the birth control campaign but not the radically 
reduced fertility being discussed in some circles and the subject of our discus- 
sion below. 
MOMENTUM 
Momentum in demography refers to the tendency of a population to keep 
increasmg after its high birth rates have fallen sharply. A hstory of rapid 
increase results in a young age distribution, which includes many children who 
will shortly come into childbearing. If fertile married couples average about 
2.3 children, the population will just replace itself and sooner or later will 
become stationary, which is to say that births will be equal to  deaths. But 
*A. Doak Barnett, China's Economy in Global Perspective, Washington, D.C., 1Q81, p.313. 
during a transitional period of about 50 years after the fall of births to bare 
replacement, the increase of population continues. The ultimate stationary 
population can be as much as 60 percent greater than the population at the 
time the fall to replacemsnt occurred. 
If the population of China is projected forward with a declining death rate, 
and births falling immediately (1980) to replacement then the population by the 
year 2000 would be 1,222 million. Let us compare this with the medium esti- 
mate made by various authorities for the year 2000 
World Bank 1,209 million 
United Nations 1,209 million 
US Bureau of the Census 1,329 million 
Community and Family Study Center 1,155 million 
The fact that three of these figures are below our 1,222 million tells us that 
those who made the calculation believed that the birth rate would drop well 
below replacement for a t  least part of the time to the year 2000. This is an 
example of the use of knowing the future population that is implied by the drop 
to replacement immediately, by 1985, etc.; such numbers may be thought of as 
a scale that enables us to see what assumptions are implicit in various projec- 
tions that are available to the public. 
The same momentum calculated by fixing birth rates a t  replacement from 
1980 onward, which produced 1,222 million for the year 2000, would continue to 
operate in the 21st century, so that by 2075 the population of China would have 
passed the 1 1 /2  billion mark. 
The Chnese authorities are more than aware of momentum*, and a good 
*Song Jkn ,  Yu Jingyuan, and Li Guangyuan, Theory on Prospect of Population Evolution 
Processes, Scientia Sinica, Vol. XXnT No.2, March 1881, pp. 431-444; Liu Zheng, Population 
Planning and Population Theory, iT1 China's Population: Problems and Prospects. Beijing: The 
New World Press, 1981; Ansley J. Coale, Population Trends, Population Policy, and Popula- 
tion Studies in China, Population and Development Review, VoJ.7, No.], (March 1881), pp. 
85:87. 
deal of writing in Chinese and English is concerned with the problem of how to 
avoid the increase that would occur even if birth rates dropped to replacement 
immediately. Such a drop is not purely abstract, since the replacement level of 
births is about 16 million, not much below what is given officially as the actual 
number. 
This literature seeks to find what will happen if China avoids the increase 
due to momentum by averaging considerably less than two children per couple 
for a t  least a decade or two. Such a hypothesis would be idle for most developing 
countries, but Chna seems confident of attaining any birth control target, how- 
l 
ever ambitious. 
IMMEDIATE BIRTH STATIONARITY AND THE ULTIMATE POPULATION 
In fact China has had remarkable success in explaining birth control to its 
masses, using communication methods developed before 1949 for the quite 
other purpose of defeating the Kuomintang and the Japanese. In innumerable 
meetings of small discussion groups the cadres of the party effectively pass the 
word down the line to the ultimate agent that must implement any new 
program--the couple of childbearing age. By means of this unique system of 
communication the authorities have put across to couples the importance of 
restraint in childbearing, and in the course of a decade are reversing attitudes 
that have developed over millenia. 
Added to the effects of skilled communication is the assurance that people 
will have a pension in their old age and so can be unconcerned about their lack 
of children. The one-family ideal is also supported by some immediate material 
incentives-money rewards to the parents who promise to have only one child, 
and corresponding exactions from those who break their promise and go as far 
as a third child. In some places, says Barnett* one-child families are promised a 
subsidy of 5 yuan a month for fourteen years, or fourteen years of free health 
services, and free education from nursery school through secondary school, plus 
higher pensions and other benefits. If the parents are not sterilized and they 
have another child, they must pay back all the subsidies or benefits previously 
received. If they have a third child, economic penalties are imposed--both 
father and mother may have 10 percent of their wages deducted. Such local 
measures have not yet been codified into a national law, and localities each have 
their own rules but the only parts of Chna formally excused from the limit on 
childbearing are the minority areas, those occupied by non- Han peoples. 
The shift from private property to collective ownership, plus confidence in 
the provision of old age and other security, is part  of what makes birth control 
acceptable. If there is no farm to pass on to the young, then it matters less that  
one has no son to take over. Child raising becomes less attractive when family 
property is no more, and everyone works on the commune's or other collectively 
owned lands. The individual identifies with the corporate non-kin group, and that  
group ensures his welfare and security. 
TOO FAST A DROP IN BIRTHS? 
The success already attained in the program has given grounds for concern 
that the drop may be too sudden, in that it will produce an awkward age distri- 
bution after the first quarter of the Zlrst century*. The dependency burden will 
be light for the f i s t  d.ecades of a successful program, for there will be few chil- 
dren and not yet many old people, but when those of the 1960s baby boom reach 
retirement age there will be too few workers to support them. '  It matters not 
for this purpose whether the individual couple are supported by their own chil- 
dren, or the chldren collectively pay the pensions for the aged people of the  
*Ansley J. Coale, Population Trends, Population Policy, and Population Studies in China, Po- 
pulation and Development Review, Vo1.7, No. l ,  March 1981, pp.85-97. 
production brigade or other collectivity; after a period of drastic control of 
childbearing the ratio of pensioned to working will be large enough that the bur- 
den on the community will be felt keenly. 
The models that  have been presented to show this effect of aging, some by 
Chnese scholars and some by foreigners, are authoritative, but they are  not 
simple and self-contained. It would be hard for the untrained reader to verify 
their arithmetic, and so fully to see the machinery by whch  they work. One 
would like a simple enough model that the untrained reader can follow perfectly 
what is happening. Since the matter is one for public discussion far beyond the 
ranks of demographers, simplicity is valuable, and we ought even to risk some 
over-simplification. 
Our starting point is not crude but is an exact statement of the total popu- 
lation that corresponds to  a fixed and given number of births when the life table 
is known and constant. If the annual number of births is B, and the expectation 
of life is e,  the resulting stationary population is Be. There is no qualification 
whatever on this formula, which can be proven by showing that the expectation 
of life is the sum of the probabilities of surviving to  the several ages, and the 
sum of the probabilities of surviving to  the several ages is also the total of the 
stationary population per birth. Our argument starts  from this proposition that  
with all rates fixed P=Be, where P is population, B is births per year, and e is the 
expectation of life in years. 
IMMEDIATE BIRTH STATIONARITY 
We will take as the fixed annual number of future births in China for t h s  
purpose 15,000,000. Ansley Coale* has pieced together birth numbers appearing 
in the Chinese scholarly literature, and he finds a peak of 29.0 million births in 
*Code 1981, p. 41. 
1963 and as many as 27.3 million as recently as 1970. Since 1970 the drop has 
been dramatic, to  16.2 million in 1977. We note that the United Nations numbers* 
are higher than these, and it is difficu1.t for outsiders to judge the situation when 
the authorities themselves do not profess to know it with accuracy. Nonetheless 
the figure of 15 million births per year starting in the near future does not seem 
out of line. 
The assumption of immediate birth stationarity then permits a very simple 
kind of projection to show what will happen to age distribution. Twenty years 
after the attainment of such stationarity, the age distribution of those under 20 
years of age will be that of the life table, while a t  each age above 20 the survivors 
of a large earlier cohort will appear. Of the 29 million births of 1963, for exam- 
ple, we can expect over 25 million to  be surviving by the end of the century. 
Thus cohorts of well over 20 million births will have to be supported sooner 
or later by cohorts of just 15 million births.This will come about 60 years after 
the peak of births, say about the year 2030, when the working population will all 
be survivors of the low stationary level, whle the retired population will all be 
of the higher level preceding. 
Applying the formula above enables us to say that the ultimate stationary 
population will be 15 x 70 = 1,050 million. The exactitude of this depends on the 
assumed 15 million births and on the value we have taken for the expectation of 
life, i.e. 70 years. Chinese demographers say that  the  expectation of life a t  birth 
is already over 68 years, averaging the two sexes, while the United Natioris* gives 
67.3 for 1975-80. In the  preceding 25 years the expectation of life increased 
steadily, and in all by more than 21 years--an achievement that must  surely be 
unique. In view of this remarkable rise seventy years expectation could well be 
*As calculated from crude rates given in World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1880, 
(published 1981) p.48. 
*United Nations, 1881.World Population Prospects as Assessed in 1980, p.90 
on the low side for the average of the next generation or two, but we take it as a 
convenient round number. 
We can see roughly the family size that the trajectory implies by comparing 
numbers in two successive generations. If all chldbearing were to take place at 
a single age, say 26, then by noting the ratio of current births to the population 
aged 26 we would know the number of births per person, and multiplying by two 
would give the number per couple. Thus if there are 20 million survivors of a 
cohort at the age of reproduction, and we suppose 15 million births, this implies 
2 x 15/20 = 1.5 births per couple. For the number per married fertile couple 
we would need to  add 10 to  15 percent to this. With constant births the trajec- 
tory of births that would be allowed to each couple on the average would be 
inversely proportional to the,number of births a generation earlier. This means 
that for the first 25 or 30 years the number of births per couple would be decid- 
edly less than 2, but after that time couples could average 2 children, or 2.3 to 
allow for nonmarriage, sterility, and mortality. 
A SIMPLE POPULATION PROJECTION 
Our tables show this more precisely, in that they allow for the dispersion of 
ages of childbearing as well as for mortality at the several ages. In order to see 
the implications of immediate stationarity in the births, we calculate the trajec- 
tories of a number of quantities, including the ratio of population over age 65 to 
that from 25 to 65; the ratio of children under 15 to the working population; the 
mean age of the population; crude birth rate and crude death rate; the crude 
rate of natural increase. the net reprboduction and the average number. of births 
per couple. (See the appendix by Peer Just for details of the calculation.) Tables 
1 and 2 show aspects of age distribution; Table 3 crude rates and family sizes, 
all for 15 million births per year starting in 1980. 
Table 1. Popula t ion  of China i n  f ive-year  age groups,  1980-2060, supposing 
1 5  m i l l i o n  b i r t h s  per  year  from 1980 ( i n  m i l l i o n s  ) . 
Ages 1980 2000 20 20 2040 2060 
Total 983 1127 1194 1155 1067  
Table 2. Percentage d i s t r i b u t i on  1980-2060 with 15 mil l ion b i r t h s  per year 
from 1980. 
Year 
Table 3. Crude b i r t h  and death r a t e s ,  gross and net  reproduction r a t e s ,  
and children per  f e r t i l e  couple, with 15 mil l ion b i r t h s  per year 
from 1980. 
Crude rate/1000 population 
Children 
Natural per fertile 
Year Birth Death increase g . r . r . n. r . r. couple 
In Table 1 the hump for ages 5-19 of 1980 is shown as moving down the 
table, appearing at  ages 25-39 in the year 2000, 45-59 in 2020, and so on, not 
disappearing finally until 2060 (Figure 1). Table 2 shows how there is an immedi- 
ate benefit in the form of far fewer children under 15, that more than offsets the 
initial small rise in the old as far as total dependency is concerned. The labor 
force will increase rapidly for some time, since the new entrants into it are the 
births of 1960 onward whle those leaving are the survivors of the much fewer 
births of the 1920s.At the same time as this makes possible more economic 
activity than ever before it has its corresponding problem of organizing employ- 
ment so as to use all the new hands and minds. The smaller number of school 
children will be an advantage, especially insofar as the educational system has 
not expanded to the point where the whole of each cohort is in school; if the 
whole of the larger preceding cohort was already provided with school buildings 
and teachers, then there would be organizational problems in putting some of 
the teachers and buildings to alternative use. 
In summary the present proportion of old persons to those of the labor 
force is only 5.87 percent, and the ultimate, which will simply be that of the life 
table on our assumption of stationarity, will be considerably higher. But in 
between the present and the ultimate the ratio of old people to labor force will 
first decline (as the baby boom of the 1960s enters working ages) and after 40 
years will rise as that same baby boom comes up for retirement. The peak of 
the proportion old will occur in the 2020s, and that will be a time when the 
People's Republic will face some genuine dilemmas. 
C O m  OF YOUNG VERSUS COST OF O W  
With 1.5 million births per year the population increases to a maximum of 
1,194 million by 2020, and then declines close to its ultimate with 1.067 by 2060. 
(Table 1 and Figure 2). The fraction over age 65 starts out with the present low of 
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Figure  1. Popula t ion  of China i n  f ive-year  age groups, 
1980 - 2060, supposing 1 5  m i l l i o n  b i r t h s  p e r  
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Figure 2. Tota l  populat ion corresponding t o  annual b i r t h s  of  1 0 ,  15 ,  and 
20 m i l l i o n .  
5.87 percent, rises to a peak of 21.87 in the year 2040, then by 2060 has declined 
to 15.94, close to its ultimate corresponding to a stationary population with 70 
years life expectation of 15.69 percent. (Table 2) 
How awkward is the high point of 21.87? We note lirst that it is somewhat 
above what the United States will face about the same time on the official fore- 
cast of the US Bureau of the Census. The ratio of those of the old age group to 
those of the labor force ages will be .37 for Chna at  its worst against about .30 
for the United States, Japan, and other industrial countries. To what extent can 
the large number of old be offset by the small number of children? We might well 
take all the dependents, those below as well as those above working ages, into 
account in such calculations. The young require nourishment, clothing and edu- 
cation, while the old require medical services and other kinds of attention. 
Perhaps the old should have a higher weighting than the young. What we know is 
that with the 15 million births per year the proportion of working ages varies 
much less than either the  proportion old or young. It starts at  61.22'in 1980, 
rises to a peak of 72.19 by 2000, then declines to a low of 59.36 by 2040, and 
after that rises gently to  its ultimate 63.55. At its low point it is only very slightly 
below the 1980 value (~ab1.e 2). 
ALTERNATIVE NUMBERS OF BIRTHS 
With 10 million births per year the fluctuations are enormously greater. The 
fraction over age 65 reaches 28.95 by 2045, when the ratio of retired ages to 
working ages is 53 percent. We discuss later how this would present a disagree- 
able choice: either work to older ages and so block the careers of the young, or 
stop work a t  the customary age and place a heavy financial burden on the 
The contrast is sharp between what is right from the viewpoint of age distri- 
bution, and what is right from the viewpoint of the ecology. From supplies and 
potential supplies, Song Jian* works out the population that can be sustained in 
comfort, and in each of three separate calculations comes to the conclusion 
that the maximum to the conclusion that the maximum population that will 
allow China to prosper is 700 million*. For example, in regard to food, he consid- 
ers the present area of cultivated land, pasture land, and surface water, and 
noting the speed of agricultural development abroad, he estimates the increase 
of 150 percent in total food production a century from now. If the population is 
to have 85 grams of protein per day, and if animal protein is to make up 70 to 80 
percent of this, then the population should not be more than 680 million. The 
same applies to fresh water resources, and also to capital. 
A total population of 700 million with an expectation of life of 70 years 
requires only 10 million births per year in the stationary condition, according to 
the formula P=Be above. Let us then look into some of the consequences of sta- 
tionary births a t  various levels. 
. . 
At the present time the deaths number about 6 million per year, so any 
number of births from 10 to 20 million would increase the population at the 
start (Figure 2 and Table 4). To hold the population constant--to say that there 
cobld only be one birth for each death that occurred--would require not even 10 
million, but only 6 million births per year. One can see what this would mean for 
age distribution in later years by extrapolating below the 10 million line. 
The present population 65 and over is shown in Figure 3. Figure 4 shows 
that by the year 2040, with births of only 10 million per year each 2 workers 
would have to support one retired person. 
With any less than 20 million births per year, the rate of natural increase 
would decline to below zero, and then would recover up to stationarity. With 10 
*Song Jian, Population Development-Goals A d  Plans, in China's Population: Problems and 
Prospects, by Liu Zheng, Song Jian and others. Beijing: New World Press, 1981, pp. 25-31. 
Table 4 .  Total  population and proport ion of working age, with 10,  1 5 ,  and 
20 mi l l ion  b i r t h s  per year. 
Popula t ion  ( m i l l i o n s )  ' Percen t  age 15-64 
Year 10 15 20 10 15 20 
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Figure  3. The percent  of t h e  popula t ion  65 and over corresponding t o  
annual  b i r t h s  o f  10 ,  1 5 ,  and 20 m i l l i o n .  
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Figure  4.  The r a t i o  of t h e  popula t ion  65 and over t o  t h a t  of  15-64 
corresponding t o  annual  b i r t h s  of  10 ,  1 5 ,  and 20 m i l l i o n .  
million births the decline would go below one percent per year by the 2040s; 
with 20 million the drop below zero would be negligible (Figure 5). 
We can locate on Figure 5 the plans of China's leaders, especially the much 
repeated statement that the rate of increase is to go down to 0.5 percent by 
1985, and to zero by 2000. Apparently the first statement implies births about 
half way between 10 and 15 million while the second implies births below 10 mil- 
lion. O u r  method is useful for inferring the implicit assumptions in elliptical 
official statements. 
The three trajectories can be evaluated by the reproduction rates they 
imply, which is to say the nurnber of girls that would be expected to be born to 
a girl child on the age specific rates of a given year. In all cases the gross repro- 
duction rate falls below 1, which is to say that even without allowance for mortal- 
ity couples could not have as many as two children--in the 10 million case they 
would not be allowed to have as many as 1 during the 1990s. But the picture 
becomes sharper when we take the net reproduction rate, which allows some- 
thing for mortality. Figure 6 shows this. Again with 20 million births the depar- 
tures from unity--which is to say the departures of mean family size from about 
2--are not very great; with 15 million something like 1.5 chlldren is implied and 
with 10 million less than one child. In all cases the minimum would occur in the 
1990s. One would expect that to be the time, since with constant births the 
minimum birth rate to people of childbearing age would occur when these latter 
are the most numerous.. 
Without knowing more about marriage rates and sterility we cannot say 
more precisely what the family size of fertile married couples would be. If some- 
thing like 10 percent are unmarried or sterile then the averages for the fertile 
married would be 2, 1.6, and 1 ch ld  for the three cases, respectively. This last 
situation therefore corresponds to the one child family spoken of by Liu Zheng 
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Figure  5. Annual growth r a t e s  corresponding t o  annual  b i r t h s  of  1 0 ,  1 5 ,  and 
20 m i l l i o n .  
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Figure  6. Net reproduct ion  r a t e  and c h i l d r e n  per  couple corresponding t o  annual  
b i r t h s  of 10 ,  15 ,  and 20 m i l l i o n .  
that would produce an ultimate population (on his calculation as well as ours) of 
700 million but would require one chld families for a considerable part of the 
time between now and the end of the century--i.e. until the large generations of 
parents had moved beyond childbearing ages. 
This corresponds to the statement of Chen Muhua in 1979 that  she expected 
that  by 1985 no one will have a t h r d  child, and that by then a large number will 
have only one* 
THE DILENMA: WORK OR RETIREMENT FOR THE OLD? 
One solution for an aging population is to extend people's working lives. 
With the better health that is already manifest and will surely be further 
improved in the next 40 years, older people will be increasingly able to continue 
their gainful work. One can imagine those in their sixties being as capable phy- 
sically as people now are in their fifties. And since increasing parts of the work 
will be mental rather than physical as development proceeds, the old will retain 
an even higher proportion of their capacity than they would have when most 
labor was in the fields. Given these circumstances it would be easy to specify 
ages such that the ratio of old people to those working remains absolutely con- 
stant, whatever happens to age distribution. The age of retirement would be 
made to vary from 60 to 70 over the course of decades, being legislated in each 
decade so as to hold the proportion in the labor force more or less constant. 
Ths way of coping with the concentration of population in the older ages, 
however, is not likely to please everyone. The old may not t b n k  it fair that they 
have to keep working until 70, say, when their parents had been able to retire at  
60; they would point out that with a more productive society they should be able 
*Controlling Population Growth in a Planned Way, Beijing Review, no.46 November 16, 1979, 
p.10, as quoted by A. Doak Barnett, China's Economy in Global Perspective, Washington, 
D.C.:lQBI, The Rrookings Institution, p. 314 
to retire sooner rather than later. But the main objections could well come 
from the young who would see the old blocking the path to promotion. Some of 
this is already starting to be articulated by the huge cohorts of the 1960s, that  
originated in numerous births and had a hgher  sur\lvorship than any previms 
generation. When this large generation in turn comes near the end of their 
careers their successors will feel even more strongly that their way was blocked 
by old people hanging on to employment. They will be better educated than any 
previous generation, and hence feel themselves entitled to get  ahead. In addi- 
tion to  all t h s  one can fear for the pace of technical change if the same individu- 
als stay in the same jobs for too long. Reforms and improvements in work 
organization everywhere depend on the replacement of senior staff; the retire- 
ment of the boss is the easiest point a t  which to introduce up-to-date methods. 
To put the matter  in the crudest form: the old have to be provided for, and 
if their number increases in relation to the labor force, the choice is between 
allowing them to retain the jobs, or putting them out of their jobs and support- 
ing them on taxes. Whether to  support the old by jobs or by taxes is a decision 
that will have to  be made by some later generation. And this is without even 
raising the question whether there is some Keynesian or other mechanism 
operative, that would limit the total volume of employment. If there is such a 
limit then the continuation of the old in their jobs not only slow would slow the 
promotion of those young who are working, but also would prevent the accession 
to jobs of new entrants into the labor force. 
Concern about t h s  is diluted by the thought that  it is about half a century 
distant. As productivity rises society will be able to afford much more leisure to  
everyone than is now possible. The working week will be shorter than its present 
48 hours, and this will make working less onerous. There could still be a conflict 
between the generations on how the increased leisure should be divided-- 
whether as a shorter working week or a smaller number of working years--but 
high productivity will soften the conf3ct. 
THE TRAJECTORY 
The main thing to be said in favor of defining a trajectory in terms of a fixed 
number of births is that it is simple. We could instead have supposed a certain 
curve of fall in the crude birth rate,  in the number of chldren per couple, or in 
the age-specific birth rate. But these do not exhaust the range of possibilities. 
If we t h n k  of a nation that  is genuinely in a position to  plan its future popula- 
tion, that recognizes it must ultimately be stationary, and that wants to find the 
trajectory that  will lead to stationarity in the least painful way, what ought it to  
do? It need not plan the trajectory in terms of number of births or any other 
other quantity. 
I t  could rather aim a t  a smooth movement of some entity like the net 
reproduction rate. Perhaps i t  could set the condition that  the ratio of the over 
65 to  the 15-64 never goes below -4. One could say, for China, as Professor Song 
Jian does, that the ultimate sustainable population a t  a suitable level of welfare 
is 700 million, and then ask how one gets to that  with whatever suitable con- 
straint one wishes to  place. The constraint might be the condition that  a t  no 
point will the fraction of the population beyond working age exceed a certain 
number. Willekens and Rogers* develop an expression for migration that aims a t  
a certain target defined in terms of age. It provides the vector of movers in 
each time period that would result in a given population with given distribution 
by age after t years. In application to  births their intervention vector would 
have only one element--the number a t  the youngest age group. The full formula 
with all ages operating would be useful for finding what number of inmigrants 
*Frans Willekens and Andrei Rogers, Normative Modelling in Demo-Economics, M A  Research 
Report 77-23, December 1977, p.9 
into a given city--say Beijing--would result in a population distributed in a cer- 
tain desired way after 30 years, say. 
A sophisticated treatment of the time path when births are under the con- 
trol of policy makers is given by Arthur and McNicoll*. They tie population and 
the economy, and find optimal accumulation paths for both simultaneously. 
They recognize that people move through a succession of life-stages described 
by demographic age schedules, and that changes in the growth rate influence 
the population's age structure. Unfortunately for its immediate use the Arthur- 
McNicoll formulation requires considerable data on the economy that is not at 
present available. 
We have found that the use of a fixed number of births gives a result not 
very different from those published by other writers. It enables us to see what 
set of rates are implied by statements of the Chinese authorities. Thus the drop 
to a rate of increase of .5 percent by 1985, and stationarity by the year 2000 
implies a number of births per year intermediate between 10 and 15 million. 
CHINA'S POPULATION OVER TIME 
The volume and density of China's population, along with the richness of its 
civilization has been. a theme of European literature since at least the 
eighteenth century, indeed going back to the voyages of Marco Polo. For many 
decades it has been said that every fourth child born in the world is Chinese. It 
is still true that n.early every fourth person in the world is Chinese (the propor- 
tion is between 22 and 23 percent), but if the Chinese births are 17 million and 
world births are 120 million, then only every seventh baby born is Chnese. 
There could well be more information on the population of China through 
historic times than on that of any other country. Chinese literature abounds in 
*Brim1 Arthur and C-eoffrey McNicoU, Optimal Time Paths with Age-Dependence; A Theory of 
Population Policy, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. XLN ( I ) ,  February, 1977. 
records of all kinds, and population counts go back to the time of the warring 
states prior to 220 B.C. Though incomplete and inaccurate by modern standards, 
this information is better than the guesses on whch we have to depend for other 
parts of the world. Many of the figures have been collected together, analyzed 
and interpreted by Ho Ping-ti*. Durand* mentions 21 enumerations between 
A.D.2 and 1194 of which at least the total is available. Dwight Perkins* collects 
together records for recent centuries. Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones* sum- 
marize the results for some 3000 years. 
The collapse of the Shang hegemony about 1000 B.C. and the start of the 
period of warring states occurred when China had a population of about 6 mil- 
lion, but early in the days of the Han Empire (206 B.C. to 220 A.D.) the figure of 
50 million is said to have been reached. Here it remained until the Sung about 
1000 A.D. when the introduction of new and fastgrowing rice varieties, especially 
in the Yangtze valley to the south, permitted a sharp rise. In due course the 
Mongol invaders were expelled and replaced by the Ming emperors, and in the 
later Ming days growth was steady, so that by the time of the Manchu conquest 
there were 150 million people in Chna proper. Again in the 18th century, espe- 
cially due to the introduction of corn, peanuts, and other crops from the Arneri- 
cas, according to Ho Ping-ti, there was again a spurt that carried population to 
300 million. The population of Chna was usually quoted at  400 million up to the 
middle of the 20th century, but a count released in 1953 gave 583 million. Out- 
side demographers were suprised at the jump of some 100 million, but they have 
come to accept it. 
*Ho, Ping-ti. 1858. Studies in the Population of China, 1368-1853. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
*John D. Durand, Population Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3,1960 
'Dwight Perkins, Agricultural Development in China 1568- 1968,1869 
*Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones, Atlas 01 World Population Histo:ry, Penguin 1978, pp.166- 
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UNCERTAINTY OF STATISTICAL INFORXATIOX 
To discuss the future in terms of rates given to several decimal places 
seems inappropriate when we have so little knowledge of the present population 
or vital rates. Much of the information available outside of China comes from 
newspaper articles, often by anonymous authors. Yet most demographers are 
inclined to accept the rapid decl~ne of the birth rate during the 1970s as a fact, 
with reservations only on the rate of decline. According to Liu Zheng, quoted by 
Lucian Bianco* the birth rate was 38 per thousand population in 1970, and by 
1978 it had declined to 18.3. The latter figure is widely agreed upon, but 1970 is 
given by Ansley Coale* as 33.4 per thousand, and Tian Xueyuan* as 33.6. Bianco 
spent a good deal of time trying to uncover figures a t  the local level, and he 
finds clear evidence, a t  least in Sichuan province that the fall in fertility has 
indeed taken place, though it may not be as steep as said. I can confirm from 
my questioning of several dozen families that the one and two child family does 
actually exist, though I would not want t o .  go from my observations to a provin- 
cial or national average. Like Bianco I found the information for Chengdu con- 
vincing, and in other places rather less so. 
In a later article Coale* shows that births from 1958 to 1963 were under- 
recorded, especially in 1961, and that in general registrations are delayed until 
the time comes to apply for a ration card for the child. 
What makes one so concerned is the casualness with which numbers are 
given by the authorities. Sometimes they will say that there has been a decline 
of so and so many thousands in the births, without saying anything about the 
*Lucian Bionco, Planification des naissances en Chine, Quelle confiance accorder a m  don- 
nees locales? Population 36e year, January 1081, No.1, pp. 123-140, 
*Ansley J. Cotile Population Trends, Population Policy, and Population Studies in China, Popu- 
lation and Development Review,7, No. 1 (March 1981), pp. 05-97 
*Tian Xueyuan, China's Population, Ed. Liu Zheng and Song Jia:~, Peking, New World Press, 
1981, p. 36 
Ansley J. Coale, A Further Note on Chinese Population Statistics, Population and Develop- 
ment Review, Volume 7, Number 3, September 1981, pp. 512-518 
initial or the final numbers. Yet with Bianco and Coale 1 do not believe that  the 
authorities are  trying to hide anything, but rather that  there are  few people 
trained in the collection and presentation of statistical data in Chna ,  and those 
few are frustrated by the lack of solid information coming up the line from local 
areas. The sense that accuracy is important does not permeate the system. 
Roland Pressat* has looked into Chinese data and policies in regard to 
population. He shows a drop from 27.4 births per thousand population in 1970 to 
16.0 in 1977,.from official sources, but is troubled by the rise to 17.4 million for 
1978 mentioned by Vice-President Chen Muha. 
Let us now turn  back to the cluster of population related issues, in particu- 
lar to  urbanization and resources, and see how they help to understand the  
firmness of the  authorities in the matter  of birth control. The enormous 
amounts of time and effort that  have been expended in bringing about the 
degree of control that we see are explained by the social and economic context 
in w h c h  Chnese development is taking place. 
URBANIZATION ,AND ITS CONTROL 
Every developing country has trouble controlling the sizes of its cities, 
especially its largest cities. The flow of mobile job-seekers in the  early phases 
of development exceeds the number of jobs. Ultimately, development means 
urbanization, but  premature urbanization involves heavy costs. 
The cities of China are indeed large, but not in proportion to its total popu- 
lation or t o  its stage of development. The fraction of population urban is said to 
be about 20 percent, less than many cou.ntries whose development is behnd  
that  of Chna.  That still means some 200 million urban population, with individual 
*Roland Pressat, La baisse de la natalite en Chine, Populat.ion 3, 1878, pp. 705-6; Mesures 
anti-natalistes en Chine, Population 4-5, 1978, pp. 9058; Reapparition des statistiques chi- 
noises, Populatjon 1, 1980, pp. 226-31; Evolution des naissances en Chine, Population 4-5, 
1980, pp. 96572. 
cities (Chungqing, Shanghai) big enough and burning enough coal to have serious 
pollution problems 
Urbanization in China is controlled by making many of the necessities of life 
dependent on having a job. With the job come ration cards, a dwelling, coupons 
that permit the purchase of a bicycle and other equipment, medical care, and 
various kinds of training. A person without a job, even if he has some savings, 
even though he may have friends in Beijing or Chungqing, cannot long survive in 
those cities. Anyone who tried to sleep in the street would be picked up very 
quickly. I cannot imagine a spontaneous squatter colony. The instruments of 
control are such that the number of inhabitants of the cities is very close to the 
number who have jobs and their immediate families 
One way of holding down the size of cities is by reducing the incentive to 
leave the countryside. In most developing countries urbanization is the direct 
result of rural incomes that are much lower than city incomes: In China also 
rural incomes are on the whole much lower; Barnett* says that the average 
peasant's income (as of 1979, 84 yuan per year) was only 12 percent of the wage 
of an  urban'worker. The discrepancy is of course greatest between the urban 
worker and the peasant in a remote part of the country. But recent policies 
have done much to raise rural incomes. Aside from some freeing of markets, the 
state purchase prices for agricultural goods was raised considerably in 1979. 
For the whole period from 1952 to 1977 the state's purchase price for farm pro- 
ducts increased by 68.8 percent, whle the sale prices of chemical fertilizers, 
pesticides, and farm machinery dropped 48 percent*. 
The degree of control over city growth now maintained does not relieve the 
authorities of concern about the future. Even in good years some imports of 
*A.Dook Barnett ,  China's Economy  TI Global Perspective, Brookings, 1881, p.342 
*Barnett 1Q81, p.341 
wheat are necessary (partly offset by exports of rice) largely to fill gaps in city 
stocks; in bad years the imports can take up a large part of funds planned for 
purchase of capital goods. If the grain crop in a good year (say 1978) is 305 mil- 
lion tons then a drop of 5 percent would require imports of 15 million tons to 
maintain the previous level of diet, and t h s  would cost upwards of $4 billion, 
depending on how bad crops were elsewhere in the world. That total export 
income from everything in 1978 was only If610 billion shows how a perfectly pos- 
sible food deficit would cut into industrialization. The matter is not hypotheti- 
cal. In 1979 grain imports minus rice exports amounted to just under 10 million 
tons* and so accounted for something like one third of the total export income. 
Any increase in population, especially in city population, adds just that ele- 
ment of uncertainty to the development process. Could it be covered by 
increased land taxes in the countryside? At present some 50 million tons are 
what the Chinese call commodity grain, a part of which is collected by the land 
tax in kind,which runs about 5 percent of output. To increase t h ~ s  task would 
risk resuscitating the confict that authorities and public alike hope is a thing of 
the past. 
:Employment for the children of city people is a problem that the cultural 
revolution solved by simply ordering them out to  do farm work in Inner Mongolia 
and other distant places. Such a solution is out of the question now for two rea- 
sons: present agricultural manpower is sufficient; to order young people into the 
countryside now would be another way of creating antagonism. Thus population 
control would have among other advantages the lightening of the incipient prob- 
lem of cities outgrowing their need for industrial manpower. 
While surplus population in the countryside is less of a burden than surplus 
population in the cities, the countryside also has its problems. Mechanization 
of the work in the fields was pursued vigorously for a while; now it is emphasized 
less. Nonetheless output per person employed in agriculture is increasing, and 
good new lands are hard to find. Agriculture's share of the gross domestic pro- 
duct has declined* from 47 percent in 1952 to 26 percent in 1970, and industry 
has grown from 17 percent in 1952 to 42 percent in 1970. Every effort is being 
made to stimulate small industry in the countryside to take up the labor 
released from farming, but finding even the relatively small capital to buy 
homemade looking equipment presents difficulties at  the lower levels of govern- 
ment. 
PRESSURES ON THE FOOD SUPPLY 
China's food production has been just ahead of its population growth, so the 
average consumption has been more or less constant during the history of the 
People's Republic. What has greatly improved is distribution. A firm ration sys- 
tem prevents people from using their higher incomes to buy more food--in some 
less developed countries as much as 00 percent of increases in income are spent 
on food, but not in China. Regarded ecologically, what has been effectively 
prevented is increased meat consumption by some while others are still hungry; 
what grai.n there is will be fed to people rather than to cows and pigs. People 
are urged to spend their increased income on manufactured goods rather than 
on food. 
Yet the latent demand for food is strong, and the authorities have called for 
an improvement in the national. diet*. Whether the new policies--especially 
greater incentives to farmers--will increase output enough to keep up with the 
increasing demand is not clear; it is possible that the provision of some meat will 
only increase appetites for more meat. Once again, it is impossible to think 
about thls problem, given the intensity of China's use of arable land, without see- 
ing it as tied to  population and its increase 
Chairman Mao's vision was the integration of industry with agriculture and a 
reduction of differences between manual and mental labors*. Presumably the 
mechanization of the work in the fields will release labor for local industries-- 
there is no intention of having it flow to the cities. Par t  of the labor released 
goes into local production of the mechanical equipment, some of whlch takes 
place in very small workshops. Other manpower can go into livestock, fishing, 
and manufacturing of light consumer goods. Disp1acin.g labor in the fields will 
only make the country poorer if the displaced labor is not put to productive 
work somewhere else. 
Decentralized manufacture is not without its problems. Most agricultural 
machinery is low in quality and difficult to maintain and repair. Since the 
machines are produced in thousands of small workshops, parts are  rarely inter- 
changeable, and keeping a stock of repair parts locally is a nightmare. The 
responsibility for each part lies not with the concern that  assembled and sold 
the tractor, but with the maker of the part,  so recourse in case of failure is 
difficult. Beijing initiated a campaign in 1979 to acheve "standardization, seriali- 
zation, and versatility."* 
ENERGY AND ITS LIMITS 
China's energy potential is considerable, but its development is not going to  
be easy. Coal has been the main source for a long time, and it is possible that  
C l n a  has one fifth of all the recoverable coal in the earth's crust,  but its mines 
are old and badly need reequipping*. The growth of output has slowed in recent 
*Leo A. Orleans, Agricultural Mechanisation, in Leo A. Orleans, Ed. Science in Contemporary 
China, Stanford University Press, 1980, pp. 373-380 
'Orleans, 1980 p.379 
'Barnett, 1981, p.418. 
years. In some places factories are close enough together to make the air black; 
burning the coal more cleanly will require much investment. China has large 
reserves of natural gas, and production has expanded in recent years, especially 
in Sichuan. But heavy investments in pipelines, or else in liquefaction plants, 
will be needed if use of this resource is to become widespread. Oil production 
expanded greatly in the North and the Northeast as new fields were discovered. 
The Tachlng field went into operation in 1960 and by 1976 produced 43 million 
tons*. In the period from 1950 through 1976 oil production as a whole increased 
at an average rate of 26 percent per year. But like that of coal, the increase of 
oil has slowed in the last two or three years. Negotiations are proceeding for 
exploiting both inland and offshore oil. Reserves have been estimated* and the 
conclusion seems to be that ultimately recoverable oil reserves are somewhere 
between 40 and 100 billion barrels. At present rates of use, that would be 
enough for 100 years, but the rate will increase. The time that these reserves 
'. \ 
will last for a prosperous China is very much dependent on whether it has 700 
million or 1.4 billion people. 
The limits to population and welfare set by energy are not as tight as those 
set by food, but the exploitation of energy resources is going to require a great 
deal of capital. To accumulate the necessary capital for these and other pur- 
poses a slower rate of population growth, even negative growth, will help. So the 
need for capital can be added to the limits of food supplies and the difficulties of 
employing the young generation as reasons for the in.sistence on population con- 
trol. 
'Barnett  1981, p.434 
*By the CIA as well as t h e  US Geological Survey 
SCIENCE GIVES HOPE 
Chna's resources are not plentiful in relation to her one billion population, 
and she has a severe problem of finding the capital to develop resources without 
mortgaging herself to foreigners on the one hand, or imposing unacceptable 
sacrifices on her own population on the other. 
In contrast to the view held for a decade up to 1976, a main hope now is 
that science can amplify those resources. Chna is the third producer of coal, 
not far behind the United States and the USSR, but needs to produce much 
more and to burn it with less pollution. Chna's total energy consumption at 600 
kg. of coal equivalent per head is well ahead of that of India (250 kg.) but behind 
Brazil (750 kg.) and far behnd Mexico (1300 kg.)*. The eight-year plan 1978-85 
puts energy second, after agriculture, in the priorities for modernization. 
China's scarcest resource is technical manpower, and she is determined to 
economize t h s  by using whatever scientific techniques and results she can 
import from the West. In pollution control, made urgent by the extensive use of 
coal and the prospect 'of more use, the instrumentation for determining trace 
intoxicants, laser scanning to measure particulate concentration, analysis of 
flue gases from steel-smelting furnaces, are matters in whch western technol- 
ogy is being assimi.lated*. She is also using western techniques for improving the 
traditional methods of composting organic materials. 
In medicine one sees Western and Chnese techniques in use in the same 
hospital, Beijing's Hospital. of Traditional Chinese Medicine uses computers for 
diagnosis. One has the impression that many of the traditional cures are 
effective, and some sorting out is badly required. What is plainly needed are 
more clinical trials to  evaluate the numerous herbs and drugs, and some of this 
+Vaclav Srnil, Energy, in Leo k Orleans, Ed., Science in Contemporary China. Stanford 
University Press, lQ8O p. 407. 
+Baruch Boxer, Environmental Science, in Orleans 1980, p. 472. 
is being undertaken by Western trained Chinese doctors, responding to Chair- 
man Mao's injunction to combine Western and traditional medicine. Combined 
methods are being used in the study and treatment of hepatitis, for which an 
effective vaccine is still to be found. 
In one respect at least Chinese medicine is different from, and demographi- 
cally more effective than ours. Where our medical scientists are especially 
drawn to rare diseases, where the scientific payoff is greatest, the Chinese 
researcher is under the injunction* of Huang Jiasi, president of the Chnese 
Academy of Medical Sciences: "The problems of prevention and treatment of 
diseases most frequently seen [must] always top the list of medical services and 
medical research.." The extraordinary fall in the Chinese death rate can well be 
attributed to this policy, along with the use of paramedical personnel--barefoot 
doctors, as they are still called, though all that  I met wore shoes. There is a limit 
to what people with three months training can do, but they have been success- 
ful in screening for certain kinds of cancer. For a long time the emphasis was 
that prescribed by Chairman Mao, who attacked what he called the "Ministry of 
Urban Gentleman's Health" and doctors who had read too many books, and who 
"work divorced from the masses ... at the so-called pinnacle of science." Medical 
school curricula were reduced, to produce physicians in three rather than in five 
or six years. There may have been something to be said for this policy in its 
time, but it has since been quietly set aside. 
Talented individuals continued to do research in all but the darkest periods 
of the gang-of-four. In 1966 Science acclaimed the synthesis of insulin in Chlna 
as a major achevement*. At the end of a period in which the infectious diseases 
came to be largely controlled, the authorities began again to give priority to 
*Myron Wegman, Biomedical Research: Clinical and Public Health Aspects, in Orleans, 1980 p. 
269. 
'H.M. Temin, Basic Biomedical Research, in Orleans, 1Q80, p.256. 
basic biology. Genetic engineering was singled out for priority treatment in the 
1978 National Plan for the Development of Science. 
The combination of western science and instrumentation, traditional 
approaches and the Maoist appeal to the masses is to be found in the study of 
earthquakes. Chna is particularly subject to earthquakes, and it has records 
extending back some 3000 years* which permit mapping the country to show the 
susceptible areas. Tectonic and regional stress analysis, ground tilt or deforma- 
tion, and the periodicity shown by historic records are used in making forecasts 
one or more years ahead. In addition to 250 regional stations and 5000 observa- 
tion points equipped with modern instruments, there are 100,000 people a t  the 
commune level who use homemade instruments, observe water level in wells, 
and report any unusual behavior in wild and domestic animals. Chao* quotes a 
report showing nine successful forecasts of earthquakes, in five of which the 
authorities were sure enough of the forecast to order evacuation. 
With the pressure of population on the land one would expect that  plant 
breeding would have special importance in Chna, and this is indeed so. There 
are many institutes in the country, as well as university departments. Haploid 
breeding, in which the chromosome number of haploid plantlets is doubled, 
either spontaneously or artificially, a way of obtaining pure strains immediately 
rather after several years of selfing, has been pioneered in China, especially for 
wheat*. The participation of the peasant masses, for instance in such wide 
crosses as rice with bamboo, has been less successful here than it has been in 
earthquake observation*. The use of bacterial insect diseases in the control of 
insects is widespread. Insects are also controlled by extensive deployment of 
"blacklight" traps, often as many as one per hectare over wide areas. Under the 
*Edward C.T.Chao, Earth Sciences, in Orleans, 1980, p. 202. 
*Orleans, 1080, p. 202. 
*Jack R. Harltm, Plant Breeding and Genetics, h Orleans 1080, p.301. 
*Harlan, in Orleans, 1980, p.305. 
trap is a tub with water and some rice, so the insects falling in the tub make a 
gruel for spreading on the fields as fertilizer. The Chnese contribution was to 
show that combining different kinds of light catches more insects than any one 
kind alone*. 
Operations research and systems analysis are given strong emphasis in 
Chna, perhaps more than they receive in the West*. The practical character of 
Chnese OR is shown by one of the early problems it solved: with two fields some 
distance apart on a road, one bigger than the other, what is the right location 
for a common threshing floor? The answer is at  the larger field; a t  any inter- 
mediate point there would be more ton-kilometers of grain to transport. The 
solution can be extended to more than two fields. Other practical problems 
tackled range from the shape of gear teeth to orthogonal experimental designs*. 
Computers are taken seriously; the Beijing Institute of Computer Technology 
I 1
employs about 1000 people, of whom about half belong to the manufacturing 
division*. 
The intense interest in science at  all levels from the Central Committee 
down to many peasants is a hopeful sign. Of course it would be too much to hope 
that the level of knowledge corresponds to the level of interest, an.d many of the 
"scientists" are remarkably innocent not only of the literature in their professed 
field, but also of the scientific approach in general. 
During the Cultural Revolution, when science was treated very badly and 
economic progress was extremely slow, no attention was given to population--it 
was said that everyone would be looked after. Now that science is encouraged 
and is going ahead, so that the prospect of looking after more people better is 
excellent, one hears insistence that  population be controlled, down to a number 
*Saunders MacLane, Pure and Applied Mathematics, in Orleans, lQ8O p. 58. 
*MacLane, in Orleans, 1980, p.81. 
*MacLane, in Orleans, 1980, p.67. 
less than lives in China today 
A NEW DYNASTY MAKES A FRESH =ART 
The Chinese revolution of 1949 was a peasant revolution. In some aspects it 
repeats the cycle of Chinese history. As Gustafson* says 
At the beginning of each dynasty the small independent peasant 
proprietors, who were the backbone of Chinese society, formed the 
majority of the peasantry. As the dynasty endured, the peasant free- 
holders accumulated debt, incurred mainly through excessive taxation, 
and more and more of them became tenants. Ths  made the continuous 
absorption of land by the powerful landowners possible. But to the 
same extent the income of the government declined. Hence the 
amount of taxation demanded from the small peasant proprietors grew 
larger while the government became less and less able to pay its 
employees. Corruption increased sharply. 
He goes on to quote Wu Ta-k'un*: "Peasant rebellions followed, and usually 
resulted in a new dynasty." The new dynasty was founded by insurgent generals 
or by successful rebellious peasant leaders. But since the system of taxation 
and land tenure remained unaltered the whole process began over again. It is 
this cycle that the liberation of 1949 seems to have broken by its drastic altera- 
tion of land tenure and by intensive industrialization. 
We have seen how the enormous population now present constitutes a 
threat: to industrialization, and how the realization of this has led to effective 
measures of birth control. The enormously effective birth control requires facing 
up to two dilemmas. One is the pressure on the land if population increases, 
*Bo Gustafson, Economic Politics and Political Economy in China, Post-Industrial Society, Bo 
Gustafsson, Ed., London: Croom Helm, p.172 
*Wu Ta-k'un, An Interpretation of Chinese Economic History, Past and Present, No.1, Febru- 
ary 1952. 
versus a grossly unfavorable age distribution in the 21st century if births are 
sharply controlled. The other arises in sharpest form if the control is tight--say 
a t  a level of 10 million births per year: should the old people be kept in the 
labor force, and so stand in the way of the promotion of the young, or should 
they be retired and constitute a tax burden on the young? 
The process of development, including the control of population that is so 
integral a part of it ,  is associated with continuance of the h g h  morale and 
morality now in evidence. No one has noticed any appreciable amount of corr- 
uption. Even tipping is outlawed. Any trace of venality is ruthlessly hunted 
down. The attitudes of restraint extend to many other aspects of life. Sex out- 
side of marriage is illegal as well as immoral, and is as little suggested in books 
and pictures as it was in England and New England when they were a t  
corresponding phases of development. A regulated economy requires austerity 
and incorruptibility in the regulators. So far China's rulers have themselves 
practiced the austerity they impose on others. No one can tell whether this 
superhuman abstinence will continue as the revolution fades into the past. 
A P P E N D I X :  PROCEDURE U S E D  I N  P R O J E C T I O N S  
P e e r  J u s t  
The procedure used f o r  t h i s  f o r e c a s t  i s  very  simple and t h e  r eade r  
can e a s i l y  v e r i f y  it number by number i f  he wishes.  The fol lowing in fo r -  
mation w i l l  h e l p  him t o  do t h i s .  To begin,  t h e  popula t ion  of  t h e  base  
y e a r  1980 had t o  be c a l c u l a t e d .  Since t h e  popula t ion  by age was a v a i l a b l e  
only f o r  1975, assumptions about  m o r t a l i t y  and f e r t i l i t y  between 1975 and 
1980 had t o  be  made. Using age - spec i f i c  dea th  r a t e s  from Coale-Demeny 
model schedules ,  which correspond t o  an  expec ta t ion  of l i f e  of 70 yea r s ,  
a  l i f e  t a b l e  was then  c a l c u l a t e d   able ~ 1 ) .  The su rv ivo r s  t o  1980 were 
c a l c u l a t e d  from t h i s  l i f e  t a b l e ;  t h e  popula t ion  under age 5 f o r  1980 was 
obtained us ing  e s t ima te s  of  b i r t h  of  18.5 m i l l i o n  p e r  year  and t h e  ~ ( o )  
of  t h e  l i f e  t a b l e .  
For t h e  e s t ima t ion  of  t h e  b i r t h s  between 1975 and 1980 crude b i r t h  
r a t e s  f romrecent  pub l i ca t ions  w e r e t a k e n ( L i n  Zheng, Song J i a n ,  and o t h e r s  
* 
1980) .  I n  o rde r  t o  c a l c u l a t e  age-spec i f ic  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  a . t y p i c a 1  f e r -  
t i l i t y  schedule wi th  a gross  reproduct ion  r a t e  of  u n i t y  w a s  chosen from 
*Lin Zheng, Song J i a n  and o t h e r s ;  China 's  Populat ion:  Problems and Pros- 
p e c t s ,  Be i j i ng ,  China; New World P r e s s ,  1980. 
Table A l .  Single-region l i f e  t a b l e  f o r  a  m o r t a l i t y  l e v e l  of 70.26: China. 
LEGEND 
p ( x )  : p r o b a b i l i t y  of s u r v i v a l  from age x t o  age x + 5 
q ( x )  : p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  an ind iv idua l  of age x d i e s  be fo re  reaching age x + 5 
l ( x )  : number surv iv ing  a t  exact  age x,  o f  100,000 born 
d ( x )  : number dying between ages x and x + 5 ,  of 100,000 born 
l l ( x ) :  number of  yea r s  l i v e d  between ages x and x + 5 per  u n i t  born 
m(x) : age-specif ic  death r a t e  
s ( x )  : su rv ivo r sh ip  proportion-proportion of people x t o  x + 4 yea r s  o l d  t h a t  
w i l l  surv ive  t o  be x + 5 t o  x + 9 yea r s  o ld ,  5 yea r s  l a t e r  
t ( x )  : number of  yea r s  expected t o  be l i v e d  beyond age x by a  newborn baby 
e ( x )  : expec ta t ion  of l i f e  a t  age x-number of years  expected t o  be l i v e d  be- 
yond age x by a  person of age x 
Coale and T r u s s e l l ' s  model t a b l e s .  The procedure o f  d e r i v i n g  age-spec i f ic  
f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  from t h e  average crude b i r t h  r a t e s   the age composi- 
t i o n  o f  t h e  popula t ion  [c (x) ] ,  and t h e  schedule  [F ( x ) ]  i s  given  by 
?J 
F ( x )  = FU(x)  [CBR / 1 c ( x )  FU(x ) l  
X 
The c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  number of  b i r t h s  i s  now s t r a igh t fo rward .  The 
same formula was a p p l i e d  t o  r e c a l c u l a t e  t h e  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  i n  each s t e p  
of p r o j e c t i o n  from 1980 on. From t h e  cons t an t  number o f  b i r t h s  and t h e  
changing age  composition of  t h e  popula t ion ,  age-spec i f ic  f e r t i l i t y  r a t e s  
were der ived .  These r a t e s  and t h e  l i f e  t a b l e  were used t o  c a l c u l a t e  t h e  
n e t  reproduct ion  r a t e .  For t h e  p r o j e c t i o n  of t h e  popula t ion  from 1980 on 
a  cons t an t  number of  b i r t h s ,  independent from t h e  age d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  t h e  
population,was assumed. T h r e e a l t e r n a t i v e  s cena r io s  o f 1 0 ,  1 5 ,  and 20 m i l -  
l i o n  b i r t h s  per  y e a r  were cons idered .  The popula t ion  was t h e n  p ro j ec t ed  
forward by 
where S .  denotes  t h e  su rv ivo r sh ip  propor t ions  from age group i a t  t ime  t 
1 
t t o  age  group i + 1 a t  t ime  t + 1. K i s  t h e  popula t ion  i n  t h e  f i r s t  age 
0 
group a t  t i m e t  and B r e p r e s e n t s t h e  cons t an t  number o f b i r t h s  i n  each yea r .  
The ~ ( o )  g i v e s  t h e  number o f  people  i n  t h e  f i r s t  age group o f  t h e  l i f e  
t a b l e  populat ion.  
